The Fire That Does Not Start Suddenly: Forest and Land Fires, El Niño, and the Ignorance Hypothesis

By Dr. Fahmaninda Listiyani, B.Ec. (Hons), MPolEc

[OPINION] From January to September 2026, WALHI recorded approximately 30,927 high-confidence hotspots across Indonesia. The term high-confidence hotspot indicates that there is an 80 percent likelihood that these hotspots represent actual fire events. In a study titled “Who Is Behind the Fires?”, WALHI reported that nearly half of these hotspots were suspected to be located within corporate oil palm concessions and areas held under Forest Utilization Business Permits (Perizinan Berusaha Pemanfaatan Hutan, PBPH). These figures indicate that forest and land fires are not merely a matter of weather. They also reflect patterns related to who controls the land.

Early warnings have been issued for some time. WALHI, climate experts, and research institutions such as the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) have repeatedly warned of the threat posed by a phenomenon often referred to as “Godzilla El Niño,” an exceptionally strong El Niño event. This phenomenon can trigger extreme drought, leaving land—particularly peatland ecosystems—vulnerable and highly susceptible to fires. Such warnings should serve as the basis for preparedness measures well before the dry season reaches its peak. In reality, WALHI argues that tens of thousands of hotspots detected since the beginning of the year were overlooked and were not followed by concrete mitigation measures at the source. When the dry season peaked in August and September, fire outbreaks surged, leaving the government seemingly scrambling to respond.

This situation can be examined through the ignorance hypothesis. The theory explains that poverty resulting from misguided policies stems from a government's inability to understand a problem in its entirety. According to this hypothesis, governments in poor countries have yet to identify, or lack the capacity to identify, the appropriate corrective policies needed to address market failures. Policies that harm society are therefore understood primarily as diagnostic errors: governments adopt poor policies because they mistakenly believe those policies will produce positive outcomes.

This explanation is further developed by Acemoglu and Robinson in Why Nations Fail. For them, the central question is not simply whether governments know which policies are effective, but why they choose and maintain harmful ones. Policies that disadvantage society do not always arise from a lack of knowledge. They may persist because they benefit powerful groups. This distinction matters because it determines the appropriate solution. If the problem is ignorance, better advice may be sufficient. If the problem lies in the incentives created by political power, even technically sound advice may have little influence.

Both hypotheses are relevant when applied to forest and land fires. In this case, knowledge is not in short supply. Hotspot data are available, and warnings about El Niño have been repeatedly issued by experts and organizations such as WALHI, as well as by BRIN. What appears to be happening instead is the neglect of existing knowledge. Acemoglu and Robinson's institutional explanation, which emphasizes the role of power and vested interests, also offers a compelling way to understand the disorder surrounding Indonesia's response to forest and land fires. The government has been criticized for delays in disclosing corporate beneficial ownership data for companies whose concession areas have burned. WALHI has also identified patterns involving major business groups and actors with political connections. Law enforcement has likewise encountered obstacles. Changes to administrative regulations mean that criminal sanctions against corporations responsible for land burning must first pass through multiple layers of administrative sanctions. When concession interests and political connections come into play, technical recommendations may be sidelined before they can even be implemented. Sound knowledge may not be enough when putting it into practice threatens powerful interests.

This pattern of neglect extends beyond forest and land fires. In various areas of public policy, academic recommendations often fail to become a primary consideration. The substantial budget allocated to the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program is one example. Academic criticism of the program's design, priorities, and implementation readiness should have been considered before funds were disbursed on such a massive scale. Even more concerning are public statements by national leaders, including remarks suggesting that oil palm is a tree that can replace forests and claims that some experts become foolish because they are too intelligent. Neither statement reflects the scientific consensus, and both risk undermining public trust in scientific expertise. A leader's statements shape policy direction and influence how the public perceives experts. When leaders dismiss expertise, the message conveyed to the bureaucracy and the public is that scientific knowledge can be disregarded.

The consequences are felt directly by communities. Smoke from forest and land fires degrades air quality and increases the risk of respiratory illnesses, particularly among children, older people, and those with lung conditions. School activities and local economic activities in affected areas are disrupted. The costs of firefighting, peatland restoration, and healthcare place a burden on the state and society, while the profits generated by concessions are often not shared with communities living near the hotspots. These losses do not arise suddenly. They accumulate as warnings go unheeded and, in effect, are ignored.

The lesson from this case is clear. More knowledge alone is not enough. Formal mechanisms are needed to require the government to respond publicly to expert recommendations, disclose corporate beneficial ownership data, and enforce criminal sanctions without requiring multiple layers of administrative proceedings to be completed first. Without changes to institutional incentives and greater transparency, fires on concession lands will continue to recur every dry season, while experts' warnings remain buried in documents that go unread and unheeded.*

About the Author: Dr. Fahmaninda Listiyani, B.Ec. (Hons), MPolEc, is a lecturer in the Accountancy Study Program at Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Yogyakarta (UNU Jogja) and Head of UNU Jogja's Halal Center Technical Implementation Unit (UPT). She is also a member of a joint research team with Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia.

Editor: Latifah

*Editorial Note: This article is the author's own work. The author is solely responsible for its content, views, interpretations, and information. The editorial team is not responsible for the views or opinions expressed in this article, apart from the editorial revisions made for publication purposes.